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I
INTRODUCTION
Many consumers would be willing to pay something to reduce the suffering
of animals used as food. Unfortunately, they do not and cannot, because
existing markets do not disclose the relevant treatment of animals, even though
that treatment would trouble many consumers. Steps should be taken to
promote disclosure so as to fortify market processes and to promote democratic
discussion of the treatment of animals. In the context of animal welfare, a
serious problem is that people’s practices ensure outcomes that defy their
existing moral commitments. A disclosure regime could improve animal welfare
without making it necessary to resolve the most deeply contested questions in
this domain.
II
OF THEORIES AND PRACTICES
To all appearances, disputes over animal rights produce an extraordinary
amount of polarization and acrimony. Some people believe that those who
defend animal rights are zealots, showing an inexplicable willingness to sacrifice
important human interests for the sake of rats, pigs, and salmon. Judge Richard
Posner, for example, refers to “the siren song of animal rights,”1 while Richard
Epstein complains that recognition of an “animal right to bodily integrity . . .
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will not happen, and it should not happen.”2 Others believe that those who
ridicule animal rights are morally obtuse, replicating some of the cruelty and
abuse of sexism, slavery, and even the Holocaust. Gary Francione, a prominent
defender of animal rights, contends that animals should have “the right not to
be treated as our property.”3
The intensity of certain conflicts over animal rights obscures an important
fact: Almost everyone agrees that animal suffering matters, and that it is
legitimate to take steps to reduce it. In a 1995 poll, for example, two-thirds of
Americans agreed with the following statement: “An animal’s right to live free
of suffering should be just as important as a person’s right to be free of
suffering.”4 This statement of equivalence almost certainly does not adequately
reflect people’s reflective judgments; but it is surely true that a social consensus
supports the view that in deciding what to do, both private and public
institutions should take animal suffering into account.5
Of course people disagree about how people should treat animals. But the
tension between competing beliefs is less remarkable than the tension between
widespread practices and widespread moral commitments. Every day of every
year, people engage in practices that ensure extraordinary suffering for animals.
If those practices were highly visible, they would change because many people
already believe they are morally unacceptable. This point makes existing
treatment of animals extremely unusual. A great deal of progress could be

2. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 157.
3. Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 108.
4. David Foster, Animal Rights Gain Support, Poll Shows, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at
A4.
5. Studies have consistently shown this to be true. For instance, ninety-one percent of Americans
believe that the U.S. Department of Agriculture should be involved in safeguarding humane treatment
of animals. Amanda Tolles & Steve Dyott, Consumers Seek to Curb Farm Animal Suffering, 96 BUS. &
SOC’Y REV. 19 (1996). A more recent study on New Jerseyans’ opinions on animal treatment found
that the vast majority of consumers were opposed to several treatment practices common among
producers: eighty-three percent of those polled felt that confining pregnant pigs and veal calves to stalls
too small for them to turn around or stretch out should not be allowed; eighty-two percent were against
cutting off the tails of cows or pigs without use of pain killers; eighty-one percent were against
withholding food from chickens for up to fourteen days to increase egg production; seventy-eighty
percent were against transporting livestock that are emaciated or unable to stand up; and seventy-four
percent were against feeding calves liquid diets with no fiber or iron. EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF
POLITICS CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST POLLING, NEW JERSEYANS’ OPINIONS ON HUMANE
STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF LIVESTOCK 4 (2003) (performed on behalf of Farm Sanctuary),
http://www.njfarms.org/NJ_opinons.pdf. The study also asked how important it was to respondents that
farm animals and livestock in New Jersey be treated humanely; sixty-five percent replied that it was
very important and twenty-four percent somewhat important. Id. at 16. Similarly, surveys conducted in
the European Union in 2005 found that over eighty-five percent of respondents believed that animals
should be treated much better in production systems. FARM ANIMAL WELFARE COUNCIL, REPORT
ON WELFARE LABELING 16 (2006), available at http://www.fawc.org.uk/reports/welfarelabel-0606.pdf.
For a summary of studies of public opinion on animal welfare through 2001, see Harold Herzog,
Andrew Rowan, & Daniel Kossow, Social Attitudes and Animals, in THE STATE OF ANIMALS: 2001 55,
65–66 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew Rowan eds., 2001), available at http://www.hsus.org/press_
and_publications/humane_bookshelf/the_state_of_the_animals_2001.html (last visited July 25, 2006).
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made, not by challenging existing moral judgments, but by ensuring that they
are actually respected.
Our central goal in this article is to suggest a simple way to bring current
practices and moral judgments into closer alignment. In short, consumers
should be informed of the treatment of animals used for food, so that they can
make knowledgeable choices about what food to buy. Disclosure of animal
treatment would make markets work better; it would also ensure more and
better democratic discussion about the treatment of animals. Moreover, it
would be possible to accomplish both of these goals without taking a stand on
the issues that most sharply divide people. People might, in short, come to
agreement on a relevant practice—one of disclosure—amidst uncertainty or
disagreement about the most fundamental issues. As a result, they might well
protect numerous animals from serious suffering. To understand these claims, it
is necessary to back up a bit.
III
LAWS AND GAPS
In 1789, the year of the ratification of America’s Bill of Rights, Jeremy
Bentham argued:
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The
French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a
human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. . . .
[A] full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even month, old. But
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? [T]he question is not, Can they
6
reason? [N]or, Can they talk? [B]ut, Can they suffer?

In his time, Bentham’s argument to this effect was exceptionally
controversial. But the argument is no longer much contested. Consider, for
example, the fact that every state of the union has long maintained anticruelty
laws specifically designed to reduce the suffering of animals.7 Of course, the
idea of “rights” can be understood in many different ways, and it is possible to
understand the term in a way that would deny that animals can have them.8 But
if the idea of rights is taken in pragmatic terms, to mean legal protection against
harm, then many animals already do have rights, simply because they enjoy
such protection. And if we take the term “rights” to entail a moral claim to such

6. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310–11 n.1
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789).
7. See generally Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Anti-Animal Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5
ANIMAL L. 69 (1999) (reviewing anti-cruelty statutes and penalties in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia); see also Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL
L. 131 (2005) (detailing the modern trend towards strengthening anticruelty laws still further).
8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 505 (1971) (suggesting that animals deserve
consideration but not justice). For a critique, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:
DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP ch. 6 (2006).
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protection, there is general agreement that animals do have rights of certain
kinds.
Of course, some people, including Descartes, have argued that animals are
like robots and lack emotions—and that people should be allowed to treat them
however they choose.9 But almost everyone agrees that people should not be
able to torture animals or to engage in acts of cruelty against them. It is in
response to this agreement that state laws contain a wide range of protections
against cruelty and neglect.10
In the United States, state anticruelty laws go well beyond prohibiting
beating, injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative duties on people having
animals in their care. In New York, for example, people may not transport an
animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, or in such a way as to subject it to
torture or suffering, conditions that can come about through neglect.11 People
who transport animals by railroad or car are required to allow the animals out
for rest, feeding, and water every five hours.12 Nonowners who have impounded
or confined an animal are obliged to provide good air, water, shelter, and food.13
Those who abandon an animal, including a pet, in public places face criminal
penalties.14 A separate provision forbids people from torturing, beating,
maiming, or killing any animal, and also requires people to provide adequate
food and drink.15
Indeed, New York makes it a crime not to provide necessary sustenance,
food, water, and shelter.16 New York also forbids overworking an animal, or
using the animal for work when it is not physically fit.17 Compare in this regard
the unusually protective California statute, which imposes criminal liability for
negligent as well as intentional overworking, overdriving, or torturing of
animals.18 “Torture” is defined not in its ordinary sense, but includes any act or
omission “whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is
caused or permitted . . . .”19
If taken seriously, provisions of this kind would do a great deal to protect
animals from suffering, injury, and premature death. But protection of animal
welfare under state law is sharply limited for two major reasons. First,
enforcement can occur only through public prosecution. If horses and cows are

9. See RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY 34–36 (David Weissman ed., Elizabeth S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross trans., Yale Univ.
Press 1996) (1637).
10. See supra note 7.
11. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 359(1) (McKinney 1991).
12. See id. § 359(2).
13. See id. § 356.
14. See id. § 355.
15. See id. § 353.
16. See id. §§ 353, 356.
17. See id. § 353.
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 597(b), 599b (West 1999).
19. Id. § 599b.
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being beaten at a local farm, or if greyhounds are forced to live in small cages,
protection will come only if the prosecutor decides to provide it. Of course
prosecutors have limited budgets, and animal protection is rarely a high-priority
item. The result is that violations of state law occur with some frequency, and,
realistically speaking, there is no way to prevent those violations. In this respect,
the anticruelty prohibitions sharply contrast with most prohibitions protecting
human beings, which can be enforced both publicly and privately. For example,
the prohibitions on assault and theft can be enforced through criminal
prosecutions brought by public officials, and also by injured citizens, proceeding
directly against those who have violated the law.
Second, and even more significantly, the anticruelty provisions of state law
contain extraordinarily large exceptions. They generally do not apply to the use
of animals for medical or scientific purposes. More importantly, they do not
apply to the production and use of animals as food. About ten billion animals
are killed for food annually in the United States;20 twenty-three million chickens
and some 268,000 pigs are slaughtered every day.21 The cruel and abusive
practices generally involved in contemporary farming are largely unregulated at
the state level. On factory farms, animals
live out their short lives in a shadow world. The vast majority never experience
sunshine, grass, trees, fresh air, unfettered movement, sex, or many other things that
make up most of what we think of as the ordinary pattern of life on earth. They are
castrated without anesthesia, on occasion deliberately starved, live in conditions of
extreme and unrelieved crowding, and suffer physical deformities as a result of genetic
22
manipulation.

Consider, for example, the lives of pregnant pigs, which spend much of their
time in small metal stalls, lined up in such a way that they are unable to turn
around or take more than a single step forward or back. After giving birth, they
are impregnated again, and again, until they are slaughtered at three years of
age.23 Young calves spend their lives in small wooden stalls, unable to turn
around. To ensure that their flesh remains white, they are frequently kept
anemic.24 Almost all egg-producing chickens live in battery cages. Typically,
eight or more hens are placed in cages that are twenty inches by nineteen
inches, where they are unable to spread their wings. Because the cages are so
crowded, the weakest birds become ill and die. Producers cut off the hens’
beaks because of the wounds that would occur from fighting, which is inevitable
in such close quarters. Because beaks are the major method by which hens
explore their world, the loss of beaks causes lifelong suffering.25
20. David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness and the
Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra note 1, at 206. By contrast, hunters and trappers, animal shelters, biomedical research, product
testing, dissection, and fur farms combined are responsible for 218 million animal deaths per year. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 217–18.
23. See id. at 218 for a description of customary pig-farming practices.
24. Id. at 219.
25. See id. at 218 for a description of customary chicken-farming practices.
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This is simply an illustration of the kind of suffering that is ensured by
existing practices.26 Short of radical change of the kind that is sought by some
animal rights activists,27 what might be done by way of correction?
IV
GAP-FILLING
It would be possible to respond to the gaps in existing anticruelty laws in
various ways. The least controversial response might be to narrow the
“enforcement gap” by allowing private suits to be brought in cases of cruelty
and neglect. Reforms might be adopted with the limited purpose of stopping
conduct that is already against the law so that the law actually means, in
practice, what it says on paper. With such reforms, representatives of animals
would be able to bring private suits to ensure that anticruelty and related laws
are actually enforced. If, for example, a farm is treating horses cruelly and in
violation of legal requirements, a suit could be brought on behalf of those
animals to bring about compliance with the law. At first glance, it is not clear
why anyone should oppose an effort to promote greater enforcement of existing
law by supplementing the prosecutor’s power with private lawsuits.
An increase in enforcement would not, however, do anything to reduce the
mistreatment of animals used for food, which is the most important problem. In
many nations, regulatory steps have been taken to reduce that mistreatment.
The United States lags far behind Europe on this count. Sweden forbids
gestation crates, requires cows and pigs to have access to straw and litter in their
stalls, and bans drugs or hormones except for the treatment of disease.28
Switzerland prohibits battery cages and requires calves to receive sufficient iron
in their diets.29 The United Kingdom forbids both anemic diets for veal calves
and veal crates.30 The European Union has banned veal crates, gestation crates,
and all battery-egg production; it is replacing the latter system with much larger
spaces for hens and free-range farming.31
The United States could easily move in this direction—and it could do so
without getting into especially contested moral territory (though perhaps at
significant cost). But we propose an alternative, or perhaps complementary,

26. For a more detailed overview, see PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 95–157 (rev. ed.,
Ecco 2002) (1975).
27. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 3, at 108. However one may view the argument on the merits,
the contention that animals should receive equal consideration with humans, and should not be viewed
in any way as property or as resources for human use, has not made much headway in practical,
political terms. The disclosure proposal set forth in this article is much more modest, and could lead to
real improvements in animal welfare of a kind that could be supported by people with a range of beliefs
about the moral status of animals.
28. Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 20, at 222.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. For an overview, see PETER STEVENSON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ON THE WELFARE OF
FARM ANIMALS (2004), http://www.ciwf.org.uk/publications/reports/EU_Law_2004.pdf.
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approach. Among the most dramatic developments of the last decades of
American law has been the shift from command-and-control regulation to
disclosure of information as a regulatory tool.32 In countless areas, government
has required agencies and companies not to alter their practices, but to disclose
them. Sometimes the goal is to make democratic processes work better by
providing people with information to inform their political judgments. The
Toxic Release Inventory, for example, requires companies to disclose their
toxic releases in a way that can activate political processes.33 So too, the
National Environmental Policy Act makes agencies discuss, in public, the
environmental effects of their activities, in part so that citizens can bring their
concerns to bear.34 And sometimes the goal is to make markets work better by
giving people information that bears on their choices. Most familiarly, cigarette
manufacturers must offer information about the health risks associated with
smoking;35 much more ambitiously, food is now sold with information about the
ingredients and nutritional content.36 In all these contexts, significant behavioral
changes have occurred.37
It is worth underlining the two different justifications for disclosure
strategies. First, such strategies can improve markets by letting consumers know
what they are purchasing. This point holds most obviously when consumers lack
information that bears on their own welfare—as, for example, when consumers
do not know about a safety risk associated with a product or activity. But if
consumers also have moral concerns that bear on the use of a product, the
market-improving potential of disclosure continues to hold. When people
purchase a good, they care whether it will do what it is supposed to do and
whether it will impose risks. But sometimes they also care about its production,
and in particular about whether their decisions are producing moral or immoral

32. For an overview, see MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF
TECHNOPOPULISM (The Brookings Institution 2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:
SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 191–228 (2002).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000). For a discussion of the success of the Toxic Release Inventory,
see Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up:
Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 115 (2000).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2000).
35. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40 (1994) (requiring inclusion
of one of four warnings on cigarette advertising and packaging: (1) Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease and May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health; (3) Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth,
and Low Birth Weight; and (4) Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide).
36. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 343(i) (requiring ingredient list to
avoid misbranding), § 343(q) (requiring nutritional information to avoid misbranding) (2001).
37. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 29 (1997) (noting that prior to NEPA,
agency decisions were made without reference to environmental information); Fung & O’Rourke,
supra note 33 (detailing the success of the TRI and recommending application of TRI structure to other
contexts); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 243–45 (1998) (discussing the regulatory effect of the
Toxic Release Inventory on industry behavior); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 191–228 (discussing the
effects of various informational regimes).
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behavior. Many consumers are willing to pay to produce less in the way of
moral damage and more in the way of moral benefit.
Second, disclosure requirements can serve democratic functions by enabling
citizens to receive information that bears on democratic judgments. Perhaps
most consumers would be willing to pay little to improve animal welfare;
perhaps the social role of consumer, when costs may be paramount, will
dampen their ordinary moral concerns; perhaps the obvious collective-action
problem may lead most or many consumers to pay little attention on the theory
that their individual decisions will have little or no effect. But even if this is so,
information about animal suffering may have significant effects on the political
domain. It may energize public debate, activating ordinary citizens and
representatives alike. To the extent that this effect is a product of increased
information, exposing practices previously hidden from public view, there is
every reason to welcome it.
Now engage in a thought experiment, one with a science fictional element:
Imagine that people could be informed, immediately and costlessly, of the
treatment of animals used in the food they purchase. Imagine too that the
disclosure is not tendentious or biased—that every effort is made to present the
relevant facts and to do so accurately. If so informed, consumers could purchase
food as they see fit. To the extent that they were willing to pay for
improvements in animal welfare, they could do exactly that. Extending the
thought experiment, imagine a market in which consumers not only knew about
the treatment of animals used for food, but also could pay in specified
increments for better treatment (including no suffering at all). By hypothesis,
the “animal welfare market” would be perfected in the sense that animal
welfare would be bought and sold and in a way that is highly likely to lead to
real improvements.
Of course, there is much to say about this thought experiment. Many animal
welfare advocates would see a step in this direction as distressingly cautious and
even problematic. What if consumers are not, in fact, willing to sacrifice much
for animal welfare? Should animal welfare really be bought and sold, or does
this create a kind of market in suffering in a way that would be self-evidently
unacceptable in the domain of human beings? Should we not be able to agree
that the welfare of animals counts, independently of how much consumers are
willing to pay to improve it? Why should the suffering of animals depend on
how much people are willing to pay to reduce it? These are excellent questions,
and we do not attempt to answer them here.38 But at least it can be said that for
those who are interested in animal welfare, a movement in the direction of the

38. Clearly, those who believe that society should prohibit the use of animals for food will not be
satisfied with a disclosure regime. They might even conclude that it is counterproductive to their cause
if the disclosure regime led consumers to conclude that buying humanely produced meat satisfied all
their moral obligations to animals. On the other hand, animal-use abolitionists might embrace a
disclosure regime for instrumental reasons if they thought it would cause society to confront the harms
suffered by animals and move society closer to an abolitionist perspective.

05__LESLIE_SUNSTEIN.DOC

Winter 2007]

7/20/2007 9:36 AM

ANIMAL RIGHTS WITHOUT CONTROVERSY

125

thought experiment is likely to do far more good than harm, or some good and
no harm—and that if one goal of law is to ensure that social practices are in line
with social values, the experiment is highly suggestive.
There are also evident pragmatic problems. This thought experiment is just
that. No technology can ensure that consumers could be immediately and
costlessly informed of the treatment of animals in relevant foods. But if the
thought experiment is of interest, we can immediately see that it is possible to
take steps in its direction. Some animal-welfare organizations and even industry
groups have attempted to do exactly that by developing guidelines and
certification programs for food producers who claim to use humane animalhusbandry techniques. These are laudable steps and warrant close examination.
For reasons discussed below, however, the existing guidelines and certification
programs do not go nearly far enough in giving consumers the information they
need to make informed choices. Much more can be done to give consumers
relevant information at the point of purchase, allowing them to compare
producers and take account of the treatment of animals in their purchasing
decisions. Let us now turn to existing practice.
V
GUIDELINES AND CERTIFICATION: A PROGRESS REPORT
The first animal-welfare organization to promulgate humane animalhusbandry guidelines was the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (RSPCA), headquartered in the United Kingdom.39 Various animalwelfare organizations in the United States and Canada have followed suit with
their own guidelines, including Humane Farm Animal Care,40 the American
Humane Association,41 the Animal Welfare Institute,42 and the British Columbia
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.43 Some of these groups, like

39. The RSPCA guidelines program began in 1994. See Freedom Food—About Us,
http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg=About_the_rspca
(last visited Feb. 8, 2006). For the RSPCA’s substantive guidelines on Chickens, Beef Cattle, Dairy
Cattle, Ducks, Laying Hens, Pullets, Pigs, Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Sheep (including Dairy Sheep), and
Turkeys,
see
http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg=
welfarestandards (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
40. Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/
documentation.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (listing guidelines for Beef Cattle; Broiler Chickens; Egg
Laying Hens; Dairy Cows; Dairy, Fiber, and Meat Goats; Pigs; Sheep, including Dairy Sheep; Turkeys;
and Young Dairy Beef). All guidelines are available with registration.
41. American Humane Association, Free Farmed Certification Program, http://www.american
humane.org/freefarmed (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Animal welfare standards are not available online,
but can be requested by calling (303) 792-9900 or by writing American Humane, 63 Inverness Drive
East, Englewood, CO 80112.
42. Animal Welfare Institute, http://www.awionline.org/farm/standards.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2006) (listing Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs, Beef Cattle and Calves, Rabbits, Ducks, and
Sheep).
43. British
Columbia
Society
for
the
Prevention
of
Cruelty
to
Animals,
http://www.spca.bc.ca/farm/standards.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (listing SPCA Certified Standards
for the Raising & Handling of Laying Hens, Broiler Chickens, Beef Cattle, Pigs, and Dairy Cattle).
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RSPCA, go further and license producers who conform to their guidelines. The
RSPCA authorizes producers to carry the “Freedom Food” logo, Humane
Farm Animal Care has its own “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” logo,44
and the American Humane Association sponsors the “Free Farmed” logo.45
Trade groups that have adopted humane animal husbandry guidelines include
the American Meat Institute,46 the National Chicken Council,47 the National
Pork Board,48 United Egg Producers,49 and the Food Marketing Institute, a trade
group for supermarkets, food retailers and wholesalers, which has issued
guidelines jointly with the National Council of Chain Restaurants.50 Whole
Foods, a prominent grocery store chain, recently announced its own “Animal
Compassionate” standards, though its website indicates that no producers have
yet met these new standards.51
At first glance, guidelines of this kind might be taken as a form of voluntary
self-regulation, in a way that could do considerable good. Imagine that market
pressures, in which consumers lack information, lead to a kind of competition
that produces increasingly harsh treatment of animals. Suppose that those who
produce and sell food have every incentive to produce tasty food cheaply and
that the market creates high levels of neglect, cruelty, and suffering simply
because producers will lose customers if producers take animal-protective steps.
Imagine too that if they seek to protect animal welfare, companies need to
cartelize in some way in order to break (or brake) the competition. A set of
guidelines might seem ideally suited to that task, at least if they are enforceable
through informal sanctions (including moral suasion). Rather than activating
consumer concerns, such guidelines might even reflect moral judgments on the
part of producers themselves, operating as the motivation for a check on the
profit motive.
In actual operation, existing guidelines have four different uses. First, they
serve as a self-assessment tool for producers, helping them to see whether their

44. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, supra note 39. For more details
on the “Certified Raised and Handled” logo, see Humane Farm Animal Care,
http://www.certifiedhumane.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
45. American Humane Association, supra note 41.
46. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, RECOMMENDED ANIMAL HANDLING GUIDELINES AND
AUDIT
GUIDE
(2005),
http://www.animalhandling.org/guidelines/2005RecAnimalHandling
Guidelines.pdf.
47. NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, ANIMAL WELFARE GUIDELINES AND AUDIT CHECKLIST
(2005), http://www.nationalchickencouncil.com/files/AnimalWelfare2005.pdf.
48. NATIONAL PORK BOARD, SWINE WELFARE ASSURANCE PROGRAM MANUAL (2003),
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/swapManual.aspx.
49. UNITED EGG PRODUCERS CERTIFIED, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY GUIDELINES FOR U.S. EGG
LAYING FLOCKS (2006), http://www.uepcertified.com/abouttheprogram.html.
50. Food Marketing Institute, http://www.fmi.org/animal_welfare (last visited Dec. 6, 2006).
Guidelines can be requested from Karen Brown at FMI by calling (202) 452-8444.
51. Whole Foods, Animal Compassionate Program, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/products/
meat-poultry/qualitystandards.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2006); see also Andrew Martin, Meat Labels
Hope to Lure the Sensitive Carnivore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1 (describing the Whole Foods
program).
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activities comply with certain baseline moral requirements. Second, guidelines
operate as a means for retailers to assess and hold accountable their suppliers,
transporters, processors, and other links in the chain of production. Third, and
not trivially, they work as a public relations strategy for enhancing the image of
a producer group—a goal that should not be underrated in light of the risks of
bad publicity and eventual regulation. Finally, guidelines provide a basis for
certification programs for producers who want to make certain claims about
their humane methods. This last purpose is the only one directly connected to
consumer disclosure, which is our emphasis here. Note, however, that even
guidelines not explicitly aimed at the consumer market are part of an ongoing
campaign to win over consumers (and, most likely, to forestall government
initiatives in this area). Consider in this regard the National Pork Board’s
explanation for launching the Swine Welfare Assurance Program:
Animal rights and humane groups have escalated their efforts to a new level—one that
impacts what consumers think of pork. Communications with fast food chains and
retailers indicate that responsibility for animal welfare assurances may be transferred
back to the producer. . . . [T]he Swine Welfare Assurance Program™, or SWAP™, . . .
[is] the pork industry’s proactive initiative to this increasing consumer awareness of
52
animal welfare.

Guidelines of this sort could do a great deal of good, and both producers
and trade groups have trumpeted their existence. In light of their goals, the
trumpeting is understandable. Unfortunately, the guidelines have proved
woefully inadequate, at least as a means of disclosing useful information to
consumers. A central reason is that the guidelines address different aspects of
animal treatment with different levels of detail, making comparisons
exceedingly difficult. Consider the guidelines for pigs. The American Meat
Institute’s (AMI) guidelines address humane handling and slaughtering
practices at meatpacking facilities for pigs.53 Humane Farm Animal Care adopts
the AMI guidelines for slaughter; it also covers a host of farming practices,
including guidelines for food and water, design of buildings, lying areas, space
allowances, and transportation, to name a few.54 The Animal Welfare Institute
guidelines and the National Pork Board guidelines each address farming
practices for pigs but not slaughtering issues.55
The competing guidelines for pig farming are complex and cover many, but
not all, of the same activities. The National Pork Board guidelines address, in
close to forty pages, herd health and nutrition, caretaker training, animal
observation, body condition, euthanasia, handling and movement, facilities
including ventilation, heating and cooling, physical space, pen maintenance,
feeder space, water availability, and hospital pens, emergency support, and

52. Swine Welfare Assurance Program, Why a Welfare Assurance Program?,
http://www.porkboard.org/SWAPHome (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
53. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, supra note 46.
54. See Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Pigs, supra note 40.
55. See Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 42; NATIONAL PORK BOARD, supra note 48.
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continuing assessment and education.56 The Animal Welfare Institute addresses,
in nine pages, environmental enrichment and shelter; access to the outdoors;
space and grouping requirements; light; bedding management; environmental
minimums and enrichment; hygiene and safety; loading, unloading, and
transport; actions in case of injury or illness; antibiotics and other treatments;
and food and water.57 Many of the guidelines are quantitative—laying out, for
instance, precise dimensions of farrowing pens for pigs58 and specifying
permissible water flow rates required in drinking systems.59
How well could the average consumer draw comparisons based on these
guidelines? The length and complexity of the guidelines make them quite
inaccessible to the lay reader. Unless a consumer is an expert on animal
husbandry, or is willing to become one, it will be impossible to detect and
evaluate the substantive differences between the competing guidelines. And
much care is taken not to distinguish one producer from another, at least not in
any way that is visible to consumers.60 By themselves, then, existing guidelines
are hopelessly inadequate as a tool for informing those who buy food.
The certification programs for producers hold far more promise. In the
United States, Humane Farm Animal Care has developed the “Certified
Humane” certification and labeling program,61 and the American Humane
Association maintains the “Free Farmed” certification and labeling program.62
Both programs are voluntary, user-fee-based services whereby producers
submit information and undergo inspections leading up to certification.
Inspectors have training in veterinary medicine, animal science, and related
fields, and may be employees of the certifying organization or independent
contractors.63 On the industry side, only the United Egg Producers (UEP) has
developed a certification program.64 To be certified to carry UEP’s label on its
eggs, a producer must follow UEP’s guidelines at all of its production facilities,

56. NATIONAL PORK BOARD, supra note 48.
57. See Animal Welfare Institute, Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs, supra note 42.
58. See, e.g., Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Pigs, supra note 40, at 9
(requiring that farrowing pens be a minimum of 5 ft. x 7 ft., but recommending pens of 10 ft. x 10 ft.,
with a piglet protection zone of at least 8 sq. ft.).
59. See, e.g., id. at 4 (requiring a minimum flow rate of .75-quarts per minute for drinkers used by
lactating sows).
60. For example, the American Meat Institute voted in 2002 to make animal welfare a noncompetitive issue in the industry on the theory that this would promote open sharing of ideas,
information, and expertise to enhance animal handling and welfare. American Meat Institute, AMI
Board Votes to Make Animal Welfare a Non-Competitive Issue: Vote Signifies Industry’s Ongoing
Commitment to Optimal Animal Handling in Plants (Oct. 24, 2002), http://www.meatami.com/
Template.cfm?Section=Archived&template=PressReleaseDisplay.cfm&PressReleaseID=1317.
61. Humane Farm Animal Care, supra note 40.
62. American Humane Association, supra note 41.
63. Certified
Humane
Certification
Program
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.certifiedhumane.org/faq.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (describing the Certified Humane
certification process); The Free Farmed Certification Process, http://www.americanhumane.org/
site/PageServer?pagename=pa_farm_animals_ff_cert_process (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (describing the
Free Farmed certification process).
64. See UNITED EGG PRODUCERS CERTIFIED, supra note 49.
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file a monthly compliance report with UEP, and pass an annual audit conducted
by independent auditors designated and approved by UEP.65
The Certified Humane, Free Farmed, and UEP labeling programs should be
distinguished from other auditing and monitoring regimes that have no
certification component. Such programs have been prevalent on the industry
side. The American Meat Institute promotes regular self-audits by slaughter
plants to measure their compliance with AMI’s animal-welfare guidelines.66 The
National Pork Board administers the voluntary Swine Welfare Assurance
Program (SWAP) for American pork producers to assess the care and welfare
of their pigs according to criteria set forth by the National Pork Board’s Animal
Welfare Committee.67 After the assessment, and regardless of how well or
poorly the assessment goes, SWAP registers the producer with the National
Pork Board as a SWAP Assessed Site and the producer receives a SWAP
Assessed Certificate.68
One of the more robust programs on the industry side is the animal welfare
program established by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) and the National
Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR). The FMI and NCCR collectively
represent food retailers, food wholesalers, and chain restaurants. They have
developed animal-welfare guidelines for a variety of different species, in
collaboration with the National Chicken Council, the National Pork Board, and
similar trade groups.69 Until recently, FMI and NCCR maintained the “Animal
Welfare Assurance Program” by which producers could request an audit to
measure their compliance with those standards.70 Because of low participation
rates, the AWAP program is no longer functioning, but producers and retailers
remain able to arrange their own audits privately to measure compliance with
the FMI–NCCR guidelines.71 There is no provision for release of audit results to
the public.72 Increasing participation rates and making inspection results
available to the public would help, but by themselves, these steps would not
overcome the most serious problems facing the competing labeling, auditing,
and monitoring regimes, which are their complexity and their sheer quantity.

65. Requirements of a United Egg Producers Certified Company, http://www.uepcertified.com/
abouttheprogram.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Of 204 applicants for certification, only eleven have
failed the first audit. Failed applicants are given sixty days to improve conditions; only one producer
has failed a second time. Telephone interview with Gene Gregory, Senior Vice President, United Egg
Producers (Oct. 7, 2004).
66. See AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, supra note 46, at 4.
67. Swine Welfare Assurance Program, supra note 52.
68. See Swine Welfare Assurance Program, How do I participate in SWAP as a Producer?,
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/SWAP.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
69. See Food Marketing Institute, supra note 50.
70. Food Marketing Institute & The National Council of Chain Restaurants, Food Marketing
Institute, The National Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR) and the Food Marketing Institute (FMI)
Announce Certification of First Auditors; Slaughter Plants Can Request Animal Welfare Audits, Apr. 17,
2003, http://www.fmi.org/media/mediatext.cfm?id=522.
71. Telephone interview with Karen Brown, Senior Vice President, Food Marketing Inst. (Nov. 30,
2006).
72. Id.
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The average consumer does not have, and will not expend the time and energy
to obtain, an adequate understanding of the competing animal-husbandry
guidelines or the variations in inspection methodologies and frequency.
The promulgation of best-practice guidelines and animal-welfare
certification regimes for food producers is important and valuable. In terms of
delivering useful information to consumers, however, these regimes have
serious flaws. What might be done instead?
VI
A MODEST PROPOSAL
Food producers should make disclosures about their treatment of animals in
a way that is genuinely useful to consumers. Existing moral commitments draw
current practices into serious question, and consumers should be permitted to
express their commitments through their purchasing decisions. Hence
disclosure would serve a market-improving function in a domain in which many
consumers should be expected to be willing to pay for more in the way of
animal welfare. In addition, moral beliefs, with respect to treatment of animals,
should be made a more significant part of democratic discussion and debate, in
a way that would undoubtedly cause changes in both practices and beliefs.
Animal welfare is infrequently a salient issue in political life in part because the
underlying conduct is not seen. Indeed, many consumers would be stunned to
see the magnitude of the suffering produced by current practices.73 But
deliberative discussion cannot occur unless citizens have the information with
which to engage in it.
In fact, there are likely to be dynamic interactions between the marketperfecting and democracy-improving functions of disclosure. With respect to
animal welfare, most people’s values are not firm and fixed. Their moral
commitments, and even their behavior, are endogenous to what they know and
to what they learn from others. Many of those who think that they do not care
about animal welfare might well change their minds and their behavior if they
are exposed to certain kinds of mistreatment. Those who are relatively
indifferent to the topic might be less indifferent once they hear what other
citizens have to say. In the domain of race and sex equality, an emphasis on
concrete practices helped to activate general public concern. The same is likely

73. In fact, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) recently recommended that United Egg Producers
discontinue its “Animal Care Certified” label on the grounds that it misleads consumers. See
Associated Press, Business Group Shells Egg-industry Ads: Better Business Bureau Disputes Humane
Claim, May 11, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4951194/ [hereinafter Egg-industry
Ads]. The BBB found that the UEP standards actually improved animal treatment, but that industry
standards for the treatment of egg-laying hens—which allow for artificially inducing molting through
food withdrawal and for trimming or burning off birds’ beaks—would not be considered “humane” by
most consumers. See id. In October 2005, with encouragement from the Federal Trade Commission, the
United Egg Producers agreed to stop using the Animal Care Certified label, and instead agreed to label
eggs as “United Egg Producers Certified.” See Alexei Barrionuevo, Egg Producers Relent on Industry
Seal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at C18.
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to be true here. For advocates of animal welfare, the hope would be for a kind
of virtuous spiral, in which disclosure helped to heighten discussion and debate
in a way that did not merely activate, but instead transformed and deepened,
existing moral commitments.
Whether or not this is likely, disclosure policies, initiated voluntarily or
required, could strengthen both market processes and political ones. In this
way, our proposal draws on the market-improving and democracy-facilitating
functions of many recent regulatory initiatives. Here, as elsewhere, it would be
best if producers voluntarily disclosed the relevant information, spurred
perhaps by growing consumer interest and by the hope on the part of some
producers that disclosure of good practices would increase market share. But it
is also worth considering disclosure mandates, at the state and even national
levels.
What kind of disclosure should occur? This article does not attempt to
create a blueprint. The aim is to suggest a general approach, not to specify a
means of implementing it. But the first points, growing out of past experience
with disclosure strategies,74 are the simplest. Any disclosure must be relevant to
consumers’ moral beliefs, compatible with their existing routines, delivered at
the right time, and written in concise, comprehensible language. On the
producer side, disclosure will be most effective if it prompts consumers to act in
ways that matter to producers and if producers find it feasible to respond to
consumers’ reactions.
As a threshold matter, whatever disclosure is made might well be contained
on the food label itself. Consumers are accustomed to consulting labels for
nutritional information and organic food claims; adding an animal welfare
labeling component would be consistent with how consumers already shop. This
is the central insight of the Certified Humane and similar logos. Information on
the label stands a chance of reaching the average consumer, but off-label
information is likely to be seen only by the most motivated of consumers.75
Would significant numbers of consumers care enough about animal welfare
to look at a label? Perhaps the best evidence of consumer interest in animal
welfare is the speed with which producers and retailers are moving to position
themselves as supporters of humane animal treatment through the certification
and auditing programs discussed earlier.76 Nor is industry missing the mark in
reacting in this way. Many people believe that human beings can and should
74. See supra notes 32–37.
75. Labeling food sold in grocery stores is a familiar practice. Applying a labeling system to other
food outlets—deli counters, restaurants, hot dog stands, and the like—is imaginable, but considerably
more challenging. Should a restaurant have to trace and disclose the practices of each supplier of every
kind of meat and other animal product on the menu? How available must the disclosure be? Must it be
made part of the menu, or, as is the case with nutritional claims, is it enough to require restaurants to
have the information available upon request? See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(2)(i) (2006). Although the
practical difficulties are perhaps greater with non-grocery store food outlets, there are many
possibilities for displaying a label or labels that could be effective, including menus, food packaging,
and prominently displayed signs.
76. See supra notes 46–52.
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take more steps to reduce animal suffering, and this concern is reflected in
public opinion surveys,77 studies on consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices
for better treatment of animals,78 and the growing consumer interest in products
that make claims regarding humane treatment of animals.79 The challenge, then,
is to design a food label that provides the maximum amount of useful,
accessible animal-welfare information. There are two major possibilities here.
The first is to rely on a trusted intermediary, one who sifts through all the
relevant information and comes up with a rating. Intermediaries of this kind—
offering thumbs up or thumbs down, one to four stars, or letter grades from A
to F—are pervasive; they figure in everything from movie ratings to automobile
roll-over tests to investment analysts’ buy-sell recommendations. Certified
Humane and similar logos all rely on this approach, in the sense that the
consumer turns over the analysis of the food producers to the certifying agency,
which has expertise in humane animal treatment. Use of intermediaries makes
sense when consumers ultimately can judge whether the intermediary is doing
an adequate job.
For food, however, there is a serious difficulty: A consumer has no easy
basis for deciding that the animal-welfare ratings of a particular certifying
agency are wrong or inferior to that of a competing certifying agency. The meat
does not look or taste any different. An intermediary could rate the
intermediaries—witness Consumer Union’s ratings of other organization’s ecolabels80—but this just pushes the problem up a level.

77. See supra note 5.
78. See, e.g., Agriculture Online, Survey Shows Consumers Value Humane Treatment of Poultry,
Mar. 1, 2004, http://www.agriculture.com/ag/story.jhtml?storyid=/templatedata/ag/story/data/agNews_
51370.xml (finding fifty-four percent of consumers would be willing to spend five to ten percent more
for products certified as protective of animal care, and an additional ten percent would be receptive to
paying fifteen to twenty percent more); David Dickinson & DeeVon Bailey, Willingness-to-Pay for
Information: Experiential Evidence on Product Traceability from the USA, Canada, the U.K., and Japan
12–13 (Utah State Univ. Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.econ.usu.edu/Research/03/ERI2003-12.pdf (showing that consumers are willing to pay four
to nine percent more for pork and nine to twenty-eight percent more for beef that carries additional
guarantees of humane animal treatment and meat safety); Richard M. Bennett & Ralph J.P. Blaney,
Estimating the Benefits of Farm Animal Welfare Legislation Using the Contingent Valuation Method, 29
AGRIC. ECON. 85, 85–98 (2003) (surveying U.K. citizens’ willingness to pay to support legislation to
phase out the use of battery cages for egg production in the European Union and concluding that the
estimated benefits of the legislation outweigh the costs); R.M. Bennett, J. Anderson, & R.J.P. Blaney,
Moral Intensity and Willingness to Pay Concerning Farm Animal Welfare Issues and the Implications for
Agricultural Policy, 15 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 187, 193 (2002) (showing that survey participants in
the U.K. were willing to pay approximately $1.68 per week more for eggs from chickens raised outside
of cages).
79. See Rod Smith, Consumer Views on Animal Production Pushing Toward More Ethical
Husbandry, FEEDSTUFFS, Jan. 1, 2001, available at http://www.upc-online.org/010101feedstuffs.html
(discussing the industry impact of consumers’ preferences for humane treatment of food animals);
Swine Welfare Assurance Program, supra note 52 (explaining that increased consumer awareness of
animal welfare necessitates proactive industry action).
80. See Consumers Union, The Consumers Union Guide to Environmental Labels, http://www.ecolabels.org/home.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). Consumers Union provides ratings for some labels but
not others. See id. “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” and “Free Farmed” labels are both rated
“highly meaningful”; the United Egg Producer’s logo is not rated at all. See id.
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A second problem with relying on intermediaries is that such reliance misses
a key opportunity to enlighten consumers about some of the actual, concrete
practices that underlie the raising of animals for food—practices that, if
consumers were confronted with them, might cause a rethinking of existing
preferences for certain foods. Labels like “Certified Humane” and “Free
Farmed” by themselves tell consumers nothing about the underlying methods
involved—what, exactly, is being done to animals in the production of food.
Suppose it is true that consumers have different intuitions from industry
insiders about what counts as humane treatment of animals; recall the consumer
reaction in polls when it was revealed that Animal Care Certified standards
permitted beak trimming, crowded cages, and similar conditions.81 If so, then
even the best practices in the industry may be found morally questionable.
It is possible to imagine an alternative approach: a label that gives
consumers at least some concrete and pertinent information about underlying
animal-treatment practices. A new form of label could be designed that would
clearly and simply indicate the producer’s compliance with a select, limited
number of standards that have the greatest impact on animal welfare, that
reflect practices with the most salience to consumers, and that have the greatest
potential to highlight differences among producers’ practices. The specific
standards that would be reflected on the label would vary for different animal
species, depending on the specific issues of concern for that species and that
industry. The standards could change over time, as well, as the issues of concern
change. This new form of label might appear on food packaging at the retail
level, alongside the familiar nutritional information labeling. Such a labeling
approach would deliver relevant information without being overwhelming;
would facilitate comparisons across producers, thus fostering competition; and
would give consumers some idea of the practices that are involved in producing
the foods that they eat.
The criteria appearing on such a label would be very different from the
criteria currently used in the various auditing and certification regimes surveyed
earlier.82 For example, instead of a guideline requiring that atmospheric
ammonia in broiler-chicken facilities not exceed so many parts per million,83 a
consumer-focused label might contain disclosure of the frequency with which
chickens suffer from chemical burns caused by lying in unsanitary litter.84

81. See Egg-industry Ads, supra note 73.
82. See supra Part V.
83. The National Chicken Council Guidelines require ammonia levels to be below twenty-five
parts per million. NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL, supra note 47. The Humane Farm Animal Care
guidelines require that ammonia levels not exceed ten parts per million on average and never exceed
twenty-five parts per million. Humane Farm Animal Care: Animal Care Standards, Broiler Chickens,
supra note 40, at 7.
84. Litter saturated with urine and excrement leads to high ammonia concentrations, and chickens
exposed to unsanitary litter for long periods can suffer blisters and burns on their feet, legs, and breasts.
For a summary of research on the health effects of unsanitary litter, see REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC
COMM. ON ANIMAL HEALTH AND ANIMAL WELFARE, THE WELFARE OF CHICKENS KEPT FOR
MEAT PRODUCTION (BROILERS) 39–40 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
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Instead of a guideline on the handling and catching of birds,85 a label might
disclose the frequency (or absence) of bruises, broken wings, and birds that are
dead on arrival at the processing plant, all of which can result from rough
handling. The label might also disclose the extent to which the producer
provides the birds with access to straw, hay, or similar biodegradable material
for environmental enrichment and expression of natural behaviors. The most
effective label criteria are likely to be those that focus on health and welfare
outcomes for the animals that are not only important from an animal-welfare
perspective but are also easily imagined by consumers. Thus, some husbandry
practices that are no doubt important from a welfare perspective—a lighting
standard, for instance—may prove difficult to translate to a consumer-based
label unless they can be cast in terms of tangible health and welfare effects.
Consumers would not know, without further research, what happens to the
birds if they get too little or too much light, whereas the frequency or absence
of physical injuries, or opportunities for movement and environmental
enrichment, are easily grasped.
Because of the need for brevity and the difficulty in distilling some animalwelfare criteria, a consumer-focused label could not hope to capture the full
range of important factors that bear on animal welfare. Of course framing
effects would greatly matter. Information can be conveyed in many different
ways, and some ways of conveying information would have far more impact
than others.86 The label would most likely serve to complement, rather than
supplant, the further development of certification and auditing regimes.
There is a hidden virtue, however, in the label’s inevitable incompleteness.
Decisions as to which factors make it on to the label, and how those factors will
be described, will involve judgment calls, which will no doubt be subject to
considerable discussion among producer groups, animal-welfare organizations,
and (for mandatory disclosure regimes) government regulators as well. A
producer may be reluctant to disclose welfare criteria that paint a grim picture
in consumers’ minds of how animals are treated (e.g., frequency of ammonia
burns or broken bones for broiler chickens), even when the producer performs
better on those criteria than its competitors. (Recall the importance of framing
effects.) In voluntary labeling systems, at least, the language describing the
welfare criteria will need to be crafted to accommodate this concern. This may

food/fs/sc/scah/out39_en.pdf (produced for the European Commission Health & Consumer Protection
Directorate-General). For more details on the health and cost effects of poor litter quality
management, see CASEY W. RITZ ET AL., LITTER QUALITY AND BROILER PERFORMANCE 1267
(2005), available at http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubs/PDF/B1267.pdf.
85. The National Chicken Council guidelines provide, among other things, that “[w]henever birds
are handled for any reason, including vaccinations, treatments, and movement to new facilities or to
processing, handling should be accomplished in such a manner as to avoid injuries. Abuse of the
animals should not be tolerated under any circumstances. . . . The number of birds in the catcher’s hand
depends on the size of the bird and should not cause injury to the birds. For birds weighing more than
four pounds, the maximum number of birds per hand is five.” See NATIONAL CHICKEN COUNCIL,
supra note 47, at 8.
86. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
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not be an insurmountable problem. A disclosure can be cast as “ninety-eight
percent of the birds are injury-free” just as easily, and just as accurately, as “two
percent of birds suffer from broken bones or ammonia burns.” The emphasis is
different, of course, and producers and animal advocates will disagree about
which they prefer; the “ninety-eight percent are injury-free” phrase seems far
more comforting than the idea that “two percent suffer from broken bones or
burns.” The larger point is that discussion of what should be on the label would
help stimulate public debate on existing practices and animal welfare in much
the same way that development of a federal definition of “organic” and related
claims has focused debate on organic standards. Both the label and the process
for developing the label would move animal-welfare issues into the fore.
The emphasis here has been on disclosure through food labels, but a more
modest approach would enlist the Internet to publicize information about
practices that bear on animal welfare. It is easy to imagine a new website that
collects relevant information and makes it easily available to those who are
interested, for purposes of either consumer choices or democratic initiatives.
The Toxic Release Inventory is effective in part because of the easy availability,
via the Internet, of relevant information. A private website might well initiate a
similar process for animal welfare. If such a step would not do as much as a
consumer label, at least it would provide a helpful start.
If a labeling or other disclosure regime could be created to give consumers
insight into actual practices affecting animal welfare, how would producers be
affected? Disclosure regimes are effective in inducing changes in behavior only
to the extent that disclosers are able to detect and respond to audience reaction.
There is every reason to believe that these conditions would be present for
producers. Consumers vote with their pocketbooks and, to say the least,
producers are sensitive to profits and market share. If disclosure of animalwelfare information causes a shift in consumer demand, producers will detect
the shift and be motivated to accommodate that demand.
How easily could producers shift their methods to accommodate new
demand for humane practices? A number of factors, all involving cost, would
come into play: the cost, for producers, of increased adherence to animal
welfare standards; the extent to which producers would be able to pass these
extra costs on to consumers; the speed with which producers could shift to more
humane techniques; and the cost, for food retailers, of switching their suppliers
to those that use more humane methods. The answers to these questions would
vary by industry, but there is little doubt that movement by food producers
towards humane animal husbandry would be constrained by the expense of that
movement. Producers would, in short, follow some kind of cost-benefit
balancing, in which the benefits of humane treatment (measured by the
intensity of consumer demand for it) would be measured by the costs of
providing it.
Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence one way or the other on
the costs of humane food-production practices in a global, industry-wide sense.
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An existing literature does address the feasibility of specific humane farming
techniques,87 and still other studies have identified changes in farming or
production techniques that enhance both animal welfare and profitability. Thus,
we know that stockpersons should treat animals non-aversively,88 piglets should
have toys,89 sheep should have moderate ventilation,90 cows should not be
continuously bred,91 and dairy cows should not have their tails docked.92 As
these studies show, it is possible to compare the animal welfare benefits of
changing specific practices with the costs to producers of doing so, and research
in this vein will be crucial in determining the feasibility of particular shifts in
animal treatment that could arise through a disclosure regime.
Lest cost concerns loom too large, however, it is important to remember
there is nothing in a labeling system like that proposed here that would require
producers to change any of their practices. Producers who choose not to pursue
animal-welfare-enhancing practices and instead prefer to compete only on the
dimension of price would be free to do so. If the costs of increased animal
welfare outweigh the benefits, measured in terms of consumer preferences, then
our proposal would produce no behavioral change at all. Changes in producer
behavior would occur only in response to market forces, as consumers are
empowered to make food choices that take into account their preferences for
different levels of animal welfare.

87. See, e.g., H.L.I. Bornett, J.H. Guy, & P.J. Cain, Impact of Animal Welfare on Costs and
Viability of Pig Production in the UK, 16 J. AGRIC. ENVTL. ETHICS 163–86 (2003) (comparing
profitability of different pig-rearing systems and concluding that pig welfare can be improved
significantly with a modest increase in cost, but that the current higher cost for pigs raised in high
welfare systems must be maintained if high welfare producers are to continue to be profitable); cf.
Dermot J. Hayes & Helen H. Jensen, Lessons from the Danish Ban on Feed-Grade Antibiotics, CTR.
AGRIC. AND RURAL DEV., Briefing Paper 03-BP 41 (2003), available at
FOR
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/03bp41.pdf (presenting an economic analysis
of the consequences of a ban on antibiotic use in food animals in the United States).
88. E.g., P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J.L. Barnett & S. Borg, Relationships between HumanAnimal Interactions and Productivity of Commercial Dairy Cows, 78 J. ANIMAL SCI. 2821, 2821–31
(2000); P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J.L. Barnett, S. Borg & S. Dowling, The Effects of Cognitive
Behavioral Intervention on the Attitude and Behavior of Stockpersons and the Behavior and Productivity
of Commercial Dairy Cows, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 68, 68–78 (2002); P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, &
J.L. Barnett, Improving the Attitude and Behavior of Stockpersons toward Pigs and the Consequences
on the Behavior and Reproductive Performance of Commercial Pigs, 39 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI.
349, 349–62 (1994); B.D. Voisinet, T. Grandin, J.D. Tatum, S.F. O’Connor & J.J. Struthers, Feedlot
Cattle with Calm Temperaments Have Higher Average Daily Gains than Cattle with Excitable
Temperaments, 75 J. ANIMAL SCI. 892, 892–96 (1997).
89. E.S. Jolly, J.B. Gaughan, & A.K. King, Environmental Enrichment for Neonatal Pigs and its
Influence on Post Weaning Aggression, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. 25, 25–26 (Supp. 1 2002).
90. A. Sevi, M. Albenzio, G. Annicchiarico, M. Caroprese, R. Marino & L Taibi, Effects of
Ventilation Regimen on the Welfare and Performance of Lactating Ewes in Summer, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI.
2349, 2349–61 (2002).
91. L.A. Werth, S.M. Azzam, M.K. Nielsen, & J.E. Kinder, Use of a Simulation Model to Evaluate
the Influence of Reproductive Performance and Management Decisions on Net Income in Beef
Production, 69 J. ANIMAL SCI. 4710, 4710–21 (1991).
92. C.A. Lunam, A.M. de Passille, & J. Rushen, Neuroma Formation following Tail Docking of
Dairy Calves, 80 J. ANIMAL SCI. Supp. 1/85 J. DAIRY SCI. Supp. 1 (2002); C.B. Tucker & D.M. Weary,
Tail Docking in Dairy Cattle, 11 ANIMAL WELFARE INFO. CTR. BULLETIN 3–4 (Winter 2001–Spring
2002).
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VII
CONCERNS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
Because disclosure strategies are so modest, we believe it is not easy to
defend serious objections and counterarguments. But it is possible to identify
some directions from which criticisms might be launched.
The first set of objections would come from those committed to animal
welfare and animal rights. As we have suggested, those concerned about animal
suffering will challenge the idea that the protection of animals should depend
on how much human beings are willing to pay to reduce that suffering. In many
contexts, the willingness-to-pay criterion is wholly inadequate. Various civil
rights statutes forbid discrimination, and they do not stand or fall on the basis of
an assessment of whether consumers, or potential victims of discrimination, are
willing to pay a specified amount to reduce discrimination. The Endangered
Species Act does not protect endangered species only to the extent that
consumers are willing to pay enough to ensure their protection. If animal
suffering is an independent concern—and our argument suggests that it is—
then a market in such suffering seems wholly inadequate, perhaps even a kind
of joke.
We have offered no challenge to the idea that the suffering of animals ought
not to depend on how much people are willing to pay to prevent it. But at the
very least, people should be allowed to provide further protection to animals if
they are willing to pay for that protection. A serious problem with the current
situation is that it does not provide an easy mechanism by which people can
express their moral commitments. Even if such a mechanism would do far less
than ought to be done, the argument on its behalf is straightforward. Those who
have especially strong commitments to animal rights and animal welfare should
welcome a step in this direction—if only because it will increase the visibility of
the practices to which they object, in a way that might well lead to more
significant change. Recall that our proposal is agnostic on the most ambitious
claims about human treatment of animals; the hope is that disclosure strategies
might be favored by those with competing views about those claims.
We can imagine a different kind of objection. Why should disclosure
principles focus on the use of animals? There are many possible candidates for
disclosure to consumers, even if food is our only concern. Disclosure might be
encouraged or mandated for environmental effects, salaries of high-level
employees and salaries of low-level employees, workplace accidents, layoffs,
charitable activities on the part of firms, and much more. For all of these items,
consumers might be willing to pay something to ensure compliance with their
moral commitments. But a market in morality might create a range of problems.
For one thing, consumers might not have an adequate understanding of the
meaning of any particular disclosure, and their reactions might not be entirely
rational. (What is the rational response to significant layoffs in the last year, or
to $25,000 annual salaries for many employees?) There is also a serious
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question of priority-setting: Why should any particular item be singled out for
disclosure, as opposed to various others?
These are perfectly legitimate questions, and our proposal does not make
any general claims about the limits of disclosure or even about priority-setting.
With respect to animal welfare, the argument for disclosure stems from the
evident fact that many consumers do care, rationally, about suffering, and from
the expectation that disclosure can be undertaken in a way that will be
genuinely informative. Perhaps other information presents at least as strong an
argument for disclosure. But it is not easy to find other areas in which existing
moral commitments are so palpably ill-served by existing markets simply
because the underlying practices are invisible.
VIII
CONCLUSION
With respect to animal welfare, people’s practices do not correspond to their
moral judgments, simply because people lack basic information about how
animals are treated. A key question is how to make those practices more visible
so as to enable consumers to choose as they wish. Our motivation here has been
a belief that much more can be done to provide consumers with information
that will enable them to make choices that fit with their values.
Existing animal-welfare certification and assurance programs run by trade
groups and animal-welfare organizations are steps in the right direction—but
they are no more than that. A better labeling system could improve both
market processes and democratic ones. It would improve markets because
many consumers care about animal welfare, and they lack relevant information
when they decide what to buy and what to eat. A degree of market competition,
with respect to the treatment of animals, would be valuable for human beings
and animals alike. A labeling system would improve democratic processes as
well, because it would ensure that political judgments be based on a real
awareness of the stakes. The most modest step, helping to accomplish similar
goals, would be a website that collects relevant information about the treatment
of animals used for food. But we have explored approaches that go well beyond
that modest step by ensuring labeling that informs consumers of animal
treatment.
Defenders of animal rights are most unlikely to believe that a labeling
regime will do all of what must be done. In their view, more aggressive
measures, directly forbidding the cruelty and mistreatment, would be far better.
But our goal here has been far more modest. A serious problem lies in the
mismatch between people’s moral commitments and their actual practices. A
disclosure regime might not bring human practices into alignment with what
morality requires, but it would have the important virtue of moving those
practices in the direction of existing moral beliefs.

